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Costs of adjustment to climate change
There is considerable scientific evidence to suggest that human activity will lead to
significant climatic change over the next fifty years. The most important example is the
‘greenhouse effect’ which, it has been predicted, will lead to an increase in global mean
temperature of between 0.5°C and 2.5°C over the next 50 years and between 1.4°C a d
5.8°C over the next 100 years (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001). It is
also predicted that sea levels will rise by between 0.09 and 0.88 metres over the next 100
years.
In response to these predictions a large number of developed countries signed the
Kyoto protocol in 1997. The Protocol is aimed at mitigating global warming, primarily
by reducing net emissions of the main ‘greenhouse gases’: carbon dioxide (CO2), carbon
monoxide (CO), nitrous oxide (NO) methane (CH4) and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)). A
variety of proposals have been put forward aimed at achieving the reductions in emissions
proposed under the Protocol.
Some of these proposals, most notably reductions in CFC emissions, involve relatively
low costs and have additional benefits, such as reduced damage to the atmospheric ozone
layer, sufficient to justify them even in the absence of concerns about global warming.
Others, such as reductions in emissions sufficient to stabilize the current atmospheric
stocks of CO2, would involve substantial economic and social costs.
The government of the United States has announced its intention not to ratify or
implement the Kyoto Protocol. In part, this reflects the view of a number of economists
and others that the costs of global warming are less than the costs of any action to reduce
greenhouse emissions (Moore 1998).
In order to assess the validity of such claims, it is necessary to formulate some
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estimates of the likely costs of climatic change. One approach is to catalog likely adverse
effects such as the submersion of some Pacific islands, increased severity of monsoons
and hurricanes in tropical and sub-tropical areas, higher irconditioning costs, increased
prevalence of tropical diseases and reduced agricultural yields or, at an extreme, the
conversion of currently fertile areas into desert (IInt rgovernmental Panel on Climate
Change 2001). However, critics have argued that such an estimate would be incomplete
because of the failure to take into account offsetting benefits. To take the simplest
example, cool areas with short growing seasons could see an increase in agricultural
yields.  Hence, critics argue is not clear whether worldwide growing conditions would
improve or deteriorate.
After seeking to take account of both costs and benefits, economists such as Nordhaus
(1991), Schelling (1991, 1992) and Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (1994), have
produced estimates suggesting that the net costs of climatic change will be quite small, at
least for developed countries such as the United States, and that climate change may even
be beneficial. Nordhaus estimates the quantifiable net damages at 0.26 per cent of GNP.
Schelling comes to the same conclusion as far as the presently developed countries are
concerned. He suggests however, that impacts on less developed countries may be
substantial. Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (1994) estimate that a 5° F increase in
mean temperatures will yield changes in US farmland rents ranging from a 4.9 per cent
loss to a 1.2 per cent gain.
As Quiggin and Horowitz (1999) observe, estimates of this kind may be interpreted
using the concept of a climatic optimum. For a typical specification of agricultural
technology, as employed in these models, there exists an optimal configuration of seasonal
temperatures and rainfall. Climate change will be costly (or beneficial) if, on average,
climatic conditions in the area modelled move further away from (or closer to) the
climatic optimum. Cool areas are ones that are below their climatic optimum.  They
benefit from an increase in average temperature.  Areas that are already hot are above
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their climatic optimum and will suffer from an average temperature increase.
Quiggin and Horowitz (1999) show that the model of Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and
Shaw (1994)  is not well-behaved, in that the optimal values for climatic variables are
either implausible (an optimal July temperature of -68°F) or non-existent, because the
returns function is not concave. Hence, although the equations estimated by Mendelsohn,
Nordhaus, and Shaw (1994) fit the data reasonably well, they will not, in general, be
well-behaved for data points lying outside the range of the data set used in estimation.
Similar criticisms are made by Darwin (1999). Responding, Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and
Shaw (1999) state that revised versions of the model display the necessary concavity
properties for the existence of a well-behaved optimum.
Several questions arise from consideration of the concept of a climatic optimum. If
such an optimum exists, what are its characteristics? Are agricultural areas in general
above or below this optimum?  Does the concept of a climatic optimum adequately
capture the potential effects of climate change? The primary focus of this paper will be
on the last of these questions.
In particular, the primary object of this paper is to consider issues arising in estimation
of the cost of adjusting to climate change.  The central result is that climate change will
reduce welfare whenever the rate of adjustment required to adapt capital stocks (interpreted
broadly to indlue natural resource stocks) to changing climate is more rapid than the
'natural' rate of adjustment associated with market processes.  Furthermore, this welfare
loss is unrelated to how close lands are to their climatic optimum. The costs of climate
change can be large even when lands are close to their climatic optimum, or evenly
distributed both above and below that optimum.
 This distinction is important because when land is distributed both above and
below the optimum, the static costs of climate change will appear small. The dynamic
costs will, in general, be large. Estimates of climate change based on the climatic optimum
will therefore miss an important cost category.
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The paper is organized as follows. First, we consider issues associated with the
identification of a globally optimal climate and the implications for estimates of the costs
and benefits of global warming. Second, we consider the formal properties of a dynamic
model and the associated estimates of adjustment costs. Third, we consisder issues relating
to uncertainty and variability. Finally, a preliminary attempt is made to quantify some of
the sources of loss associated with global climatic change in a dynamic framework.
Particular attention is paid to capital stocks associated with agriculture and to natural
resources.
The Optimal Climate Approach
The notion of an optimal climate is implicit in many studies of the costs and benefits
of global warming. However, different procedures for estimating the optimum yield
different outcomes. Comparisons of income per person generally support the view that a
temperate climate similar to that of Northern Europe is optimal
Horowitz (2001) argued that one way of gauging how global warming will affect
an economy is to look at the economic performance of countries that are warmer.  He
examined the income-temperature relationship for a cross-section of 156 countries in
1999.  After separating OECD countries and accounting for historical factors (which
would not be affected by temperature change), he concluded that a one percent increase
in temperature leads to a -0.9 percent decrease in per capita income.  Thus, a temperature
increase of 3 degrees Fahrenheit would result in a 4.6 percent decrease in world GNP.  It
is worth noting that if climate change delays the transition from a non-OECD to an
OECD-type economy, the costs of climate change would be much larger.  Using similar
methods but not correcting for historical factors or OECD membership, Choiniere and
Horowitz estimate the income-temperature gradient in log-log form to be -3.42
On the other hand, consideration of current agricultural technology gives rise to
rather different results. Early studies modelled the effects of climate change on crop
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yields, under the assumption that existing patterns of land use would remain unchanged.
This procedure does not involve the assumption of a unique climatic optimum, since the
optimum will, in general, be different for every land use.
Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw (1994) criticized the latter approach as a Ôdumb
farmerÕ model since it assumed that farmers would not adjust their land use in response
to climate change. Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw observed that land rents provide a
measure of the value of land in its most valuable use, and considered the impact of
climate on land rent. Under standard assumptions, discussed below, this procedure involves
the assumption of a unique optimal climate. A similar implicit assumption is central to
the analysis of Nordhaus (1991) and Schelling (1991, 1992) and is carried over into
critical responses such as those of Cline (1991).
To consider the global optimum approach in more detail it is useful to introduce
some formal notation. The value of production in land area i is given by a function Vi(Ti)
where Ti is an index of the climate in region i (which may be taken, in the simplest case,
to be summarized by mean temperature). The function Vi is assumed to be concave in Ti
with a maximum at some Ti* . Let I
+ denote the set of regions for which Ti > Ti* and I
-
denote the set of regions for which Ti > T*.
Now consider a small change in climate such that, in each region, the climate index
increases to Ti+di. For simplicity, we assume that i > 0 "  i.
The impact on agricultural value is given by
V= S
-
 {Vi(Ti+ i) - Vi(Ti)} -  +{Vi(Ti)-Vi(Ti+ i)}
where S
-
  denotes the sum of gains taken over the regions in I,-  and + denotes the sum
of losses taken over the regions in I+. Both sums are positive. Thus the net effect V is the
difference between the benefits accruing to areas that are initially colder than the
optimum and the gains accruing to areas that are initially warmer than the optimum.
Assuming that T* is associated with a moderate (say, warm temperate) climate, and
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that L is a symmetric function, the net effect DV of global warming is a residual which
will be small in relation either to the gains in I- or the losses in I+.  Hence, estimates
derived in this way will inevitably be small in relation to total agricultural output.
To illustrate this point, consider the case when th elements of T are evenly spaced,
that is Ti+1 = Ti + , "  I, and the temperature-value relationship is the same in all regions,
and is given by a function V(Ti).  Then the effect on T of a uniform increase in all
temperatures by  may be obtained by deleting T1 and replacing Tm with Tm + . By the
concavity of L, the contribution of climate to production will be least for the extreme
values of I and greatest for the intermediate values. Hence, the change in V, given by
V(Tm + )-V(T1) must be small. The sign of the estimate may be either positive or
negative, and will be sensitive to small changes in modelling assumptions.
Because  D V is a residual, estimates of its sign will be sensitive to variations in
modeling assumptions. For example, a conclusion that the impact of warming is negative
could be reversed either by an upward revision of the estimated optimal temperature T*
or by changes in detailed estimates of the pattern of warming, leading to more warming
at higher latitudes and less warming at lower latitudes.
 This reasoning is not affected by uncertainty. Suppose that there is uncertainty
about the values of T* and . Taking expectations with respect to a linear approximation
to V, the expression V derived above is still an unbiased estimate of the net impact of
warming, assuming that the underlying model is valid. Observe that, since V/ T i is
positive in some regions, egative in others, and close to zero on average the linearized
estimate will be unbiased.
Similarly, it does not matter that the change in temperature is unlikely to be uniform.
Some areas will have a greater than average increase in mean temperature, others a lower
than average increase, or even a decrease. Provided there is no systematic pattern to this
variation, the argument presented here remains valid. The only important possibility is
that global warming might act to increase (or decrease) the variation in the distribution of
8
temperatures as would occur if warming is greatest (least) at the Equator, and least
(greatest) in high latitudes.
The type of shift that is likely to occur in the new equilibrium may be estimated
using the following back-of-the-envelope approach. From the isotherms observed under
the existing temperature distribution, a rise in mean annual temperature of about 3°  C is
associated with a move of about 4.5 degrees of latitude or 500 km1 towards the equator.
Conversely, if global mean temperatures were to rise by a uniform 3° , climates would
migrate towards the poles, on average by about 500km. The exception is that the extremely
cold climate currently prevailing at the poles would disappear and that a new high
temperature climate would prevail at the equator.
The Dynamic Approach
To understand the dynamic aspects of the problem, it is necessary to model the
production technology in more detail.  Assume an aggregate capital stock K and labor
force N. There are m regions. In each region, two classes of productive activity may be
undertaken. The first class of activity is independent of climate and yields an output f(Ki1,
Ni1) in region i, where Ki1 and Ni1 are the capital and labor used in region i for the first
class of activities. The second class consists of activities that are dependent on climate.
Their output is g(Ki2, Ni2, Li(Ti)),. where Ki2, Ni2 are the capital and labor used in region i
for activities in the second class.
Total output produced in region i is given by
(1) Vi = f(Ki1, Ni1) + g(Ki2, Ni2, Li(Ti))
Note that all differences between regions are assumed to be captured by Li so the
functions f,g are the same for all regions.
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1 In calculations of this kind, the fact that the metric system is based on the earth's circumference
makes the back-of-the-envelope approach easy. The arc from equator to pole is 10 000 km, so that 1 degree
of latitude = 111 km.
Under either optimal planning or a competitive equilibrium there exists a set of
capital and labor allocations K*, N* such that V =  S i  Vi is  maximized subject to the
constraints   Ki1 + Ki2 = K,   Ni1 + Ni2 = Ni.
The value of this optimal outcome depends on the distribution of temperature. It
also depends  on the aggregate factor endowments but these will be treated as fixed.
(2) V =  (L1, L2 ... Lm) =  (T1, T2 ... Tm) = maxK*, L*   Yi.
If all of the regions 1, 2 ... m are identical (except for differences in climate) then V will
depend only on the set T = {Ti: i  1, 2 ... m}.
Suppose that the time path of climate Tit is known in advance for all i, t. The
planning problem is to maximize an objective of the form
(3) V = t e
-rt Yit
subject to  constraints on capital stock adjustment described below. We shall denote the
initial distribution of temperature by Ti0 i= 1...n., and the initial stocks of capital and labor
by Kij0, i= 1...n, j=1..m and Ni0 i= 1...n. It will be assumed that the system is initially in
equilibrium.
We now suppose that temperature increases by a constant amount  per peri d.
Thus, a comparative static analysis could be undertaken by fixing some time interval 
(for example, the doubling time of global CO2 stocks) and undertaking the analysis of the
previous section with  = . As we have seen, for moderate values of ,  a zero net
impact is derived.
Instead, we now turn to a dynamic analysis of the effects of a change in climate.
The crucial feature of the dynamic approach is the treatment of capital stocks. In the
static approaches, the capital stock is homogenous, both in form and in its allocation
across regions. In the dynamic approach, capital is heterogeneous and location-specific.
The basic approach is that of the ‘putty-clay’ model. Divergences in the marginal product
of capital, arising in the present context from climatic change, call forth adjustment in the
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form of new investment in areas where the marginal product is high. In areas where the
marginal product is low, the capital stock declines as a result of depreciation or, in
extreme cases, scrappage. To provide a simple comparison with the optimal climate
approach, it will be useful to consider first the case when total capital stock is constant
(new investment = depreciation in every period).
The production technology for region i is given by
(4) Vit =  f(Ki1t, Ni1t) +g(Ki2t, Ki3t, ... Kimt, Ni2t, ... Nimt, Li(Tit))
where Kijt represents the stock of the j-th type of capital in region i at time t. As in the
optimal climate model, Ki1t represents the capital stock associated with activities that are
independent of climate. The capital stock associated with climate-dependent activities has
been disaggregated into stocks of (m-1)specific classes of capital. A similar
disaggregation has been undertaken for labor.
Capital stocks evolve subject to the constraints that
(5)    i  j Kijt = K " t
and
(6) Kijt ³  (1- ij) Kij(t-1)
where
ij  is the rate of depreciation for the j-th type of capital in region .
Denote by K,N the time paths of the regional allocations of capital and labor and let
(7) V*( ) = MaxK, N V(K,N,T( ))
where V is defined as in (3) and K satisfies the constraints (6). Our key result is
Proposition 1: Suppose D V=0. Then V* is a concave function of  with maximum at .
Proof: By the initial equilibrium assumption, the optimal path when =0 has Kijt = Kij0 "  i,
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j, t. Define the unconstrained optimal path for arbitrary by K**( ), and the associated
return by V**( ). Then V**( )  ³  V*( ). This inequality will be strict whenever any of the
constraints (6) is binding. By Proposition 1, V*(0) = V**( ), so V* takes its maximum at
zero. Concavity follows from the properties of the production function.
It follows that D V the estimate of loss derived in the previous section is, in fact, a
lower bound. Under certainty the lower bound will be attained if and only if all of the
required capital stock adjustments are consistent with the constraint (5). That is, in any
region i where the stock of capital j s required to contract as T changes, the rate of
adjustment needed to maintain optimality must be less than ij.
Adjustment costs
From the discussion above, costs of adjustment to climatic change will arise if
capital stocks
 (i) are dependent on climate for their optimal location; and
(ii) depreciate more slowly than is required to permit easy adjustment to changing
climate.
Two main categories of capital stock might satisfy these conditions. The first is that
of long-lasting 'infrastructure' investments, such as harbors, dams and irrigation systems
and grain handling facilities.
Consider first the example of grain handling. Suppose that climatic change over the
next fifty years results in an increase of 2.5° C in mean global temperature. As shown
above, this increase has the effect of shifting the zone of grain production 500 km further
from the Equator. In the optimal climate approach, the impact would depend on the area
of potentially arable land at different latitudes.
A dynamic estimate yields different results. Assuming, for the moment, a uniform
rate of warming yielding a 2.5°  C increase over 50 years, the annual change of 0.05° C
per year implies a shift of 10 km per year in the zone of wheat production. Although his
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shift appears small, it is large enough to imply significant capital losses in grain handling.
Fisher and Quiggin (1988) estimate the optimal service radius for Australian grain handling
facilities at 25 km. Hence facilities initially at the margin of the wheat production zone
will be sub-optimally located after 3 years of warming at a rate of 0.05°  per year. By
contrast, the normal service life of vertical and horizontal storage facilities is several
decades. In areas currently close to the margin, this implies a capital loss, as grain
production ceases before the facilities end their useful life. In areas currently well away
from the margin, but within the 500km range, it is likely that existing facilities will
require replacement before grain production ceases. Since it would be uneconomic to
replace long-lived storage facilities, it will be necessary to resort to methods such as
bunker storage with lower capital costs and higher operating costs. Thus, the process of
global warming will impose continuing costs.
A similar analysis applies to harbors, beachfront houses, and other capital goods
whose value is derived from a seafront location. In this case, the central variable is the
rate of rise of sea levels.
Assume that the rate of sea level rise is 1 cm /year (implying a 1-meter rise over
100 years) and that this implies an inward shift in the natural coastline of 5 meters/year.
In relation to existing capital stocks, three options are available. First, they may be
modified to cope with higher sea levels. Second, they may be dismantled and moved
inward. Third, they may be abandoned.
Once again, there are continuing losses over and above those associated with the
existing capital stocks. New capital investments must be modified to take account of
shorter lifetimes and higher maintenance costs. Consider the example of beachfront housing.
If we interpret the beachfront as the area within, say, 50 meters of the high water-mark, a
beachfront house will have a natural life of 10 years. After this, it must be built up, at
steadily increasing cost, or abandoned. This dilemma is already being faced in areas of
the coastal United States with naturally shifting shorelines .
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In both of the cases described above, damages are related fairly directly to the rate
of change. As shown in Proposition 2, the damage will be a convex, rather than a linear,
function of the rate of warming. Nevertheless, it should be relatively straightforward,
having derived cost estimates for some predicted mean rate of warming, to adjust those
estimates to take account of new information or more detailed regional forecasts.
Rather different problems arise when we consider facilities such as dams, irrigation
systems and hydro-electric power generation. The value of these facilities depends on a
number of climatic factors including precipitation in the catchment areas, evaporation
rates and the suitability of the irrigated areas for growing different crops. All of these will
be affected by climatic change. Most of the relevant effects are unpredictable on the basis
of present knowledge . The only thing that can be predicted with certainty is that the
optimal location of these systems will change and that this change will be costly.
The distinction between the dynamic approach and the optimal climate approach is
particularly clear in the case of dams. The evidence available at present gives no grounds
for supposing that the distribution of rainfall and hydrological systems resulting from
global climatic change will be any more or less suitable for irrigation or hydro-electricity
than the present distribution. Hence an optimal climate analysis must yield a net cost
estimate of zero.
From the dynamic perspective the critical point in favor of the current rainfall
distributions is that our existing infrastructure is designed to exploit it. Either an increase
or a decrease in rainfall in the catchment area for an existing dam will impose losses if
the change is sufficiently large. A decrease in rainfall will reduce the economic value of
the services provided by the dam. An increase in rainfall increases the severity of the
flood events (conventionally measured by 50 and 100 year floods) the dam must withstand.
This creates the possibility that the dam will require costly modifications or even
replacement if safety standards are to be maintained.
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Natural capital
The second main category is that of 'natural capital' including forests and
ecosystems valued for tourism, or in their own right. Forests valued primarily for the
production of one or a few timber species may be treated in much the same manner as
human-made capital. The main difference is that the adjustment mechanism cannot be
represented in terms of exponential decay taking place at a constant rate. Rather,
adjustment occurs when trees are felled in one area and replaced in another. Typical
rotation periods in plantation forestry range from 20 to 40 years. In order for production
of a given species to be feasible in a given area, it is necessary that the climate in that area
should, throughout the rotation period, be consistent with the survival and growth of the
species in question. Global warming implies that, on average, the zone in which climate is
suitable will move northward by about 500 km during this period . Hence, many existing
forests with limited capacity for adaptation to climatic change will suffer tree decline and
dieback. A further implication is that reafforestation will be constrained by the need to
choose replacement species, such as the Ponderosa pine, that are capable of flourishing in
a wide range of climatic conditions.
The US Environmental Protection Authority (1989) estimates that the loss in healthy
woodland area in the United States could be made up by a reafforestation program
costing about $US0.5 billion per year. It is not clear whether this estimate includes the
capital losses associated with the dieback of existing forests. Also, if forests suffering
dieback are not cleared, there is an increase in the land devoted to forestry with no
corresponding increase in output. The opportunity cost of this land needs to be taken into
account.
 It is likely that losses in timber production would represent only a small part of the
social loss associated with large-scale dieback. Losses in recreation values arise from
dieback in existing forests and their replacement by monocultures of highly adaptable
species. These losses could be estimated using hedonic pricing and travel cost methods
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(McConnell and Bockstael 1979). Deeper social concerns about large-scale forest decline
are more difficult to quantify. However, forest decline resulting from acid rain has been a
major social concern in both Europe and North America. The argument presented here
suggests that the negative effects of global climatic change on forests will be comparable
to those of acid rain.
Whole ecosystems require a different treatment within the dynamic framework. In
place of the notion of depreciation, it is natural to think in terms of the rate of ecological
succession arising in response to a disturbance in the environment. If the process of
succession is more rapid than the rate of climatic change, ecosystems will migrate away
from the Equator as temperatures rise, and the overall distribution will be essentially
stable. However, if the process of succession is insufficiently rapid at a given point, the
ecosystem will be in an unstable state. Some species will become extinct and others will
multiply to pest proportions. Many of the ecological succession processes that have been
observed proceed at rates of meters per year, rather than the kilometers per year required
for adjustment to anticipated global warming.
A closely related point may be made by comparing the time scale of global warming
with previous examples of climatic change, for which some evidence on the pattern of
ecological adjustment is available. The anticipated rate of increase in mean temperatures
is considerably more rapid that any which has occurred as a result of natural climatic
processes. Hence there is no reason to expect that the mechanisms of ecological succession
developed as a result of previous evolutionary pressure will be sufficiently flexible to
permit adjustment to these changes.
As in the case of forests, large-scale extinctions will involve economic losses
associated with declining recreational values, loss of scientific value, loss of potentially
useful species and so forth. It seems clear, however, that this list of economic losses
comes nowhere near capturing the concerns of many citizens about the impact of large-scale
extinction. The way in which concerns not associated with consumption of goods or
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services should be incorporated into economic analysis has been the subject of considerable
controversy recently. One approach is based on the notion of existence value (Krutilla
1964). Since, for most people, no market transactions are associated with the preservation
or extinction of species, existence values must be assessed using direct questioning
methods such as the contingent valuation method (Mitchell and Carson 1989). This
approach has been criticized on various grounds (Kahneman and Knetsch, Nelson and
Rosenthal, Quiggin).
An alternative approach may be used to obtain a fairly robust lower bound. It seems
reasonable to conclude that the rates of ecological loss associated with global climatic
change at the rates estimated on the basis of median predictions of global warming will
be greater than those prevailing in the developed countries prior to the passage of the
extensive environmental legislation of the 1960s and 1970s. It has been estimated (Denison
1979a, 1979b) for the US that over the period 1975 to 1978 the cumulative impact of this
legislation was to reduce measured GNP by 0.6 per cent. Extrapolation over the period
1970-90 suggests a cumulative impact of around 2.5 per cent of measured GNP
If:
(i) the net benefits of the legislation are deemed to exceed the costs;
(ii) the potential ecological benefits of mitigating global warming are at least as
large as those from the earlier legislation; and
(ii) the legislation was solely directed to the preservation of natural ecosystems,
then the cost actually incurred to reduce ecological loss in the past would serve as a lower
bound estimate for the increased losses associated with global warming. Assumption (i)
does not seem problematic. Sentiment in most developed countries appears to favor
strengthening rather than relaxation of environmental laws. The arguments presented
above suggested that assumption (ii) is also valid. Assumption (iii), however, is not valid.
Environmental laws are directed to human health objectives as well as to ecological
concerns. Aesthetic and other concerns may also be important. Hence an application of
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this estimation procedure requires a finer partitioning of the social costs of existing
legislation than is available at present.
For illustrative purposes, suppose that one-third of past environmental expenditures
have been motivated by ecological concerns, and (following Nordhaus) that the experience
of the United States is representative of that of the more developed countries as a group.
It follows that mitigation of ecological damage associated with global warming would
justify annual expenditures by these countries of at least 0.8 per cent of GDP.
These results contradict the arguments of Schelling (1991). He suggests that
willingness to pay for environmental protection per se is very limited. This claim is made
primarily on the basis of the observation that proposals to tax gasoline in the United
States have had hardly any success. Schelling’s argument would be convincing if it were
true that the policy debate over gasoline taxes in the United States was a representative
example of the political trade-off between direct economic benefits and the environment.
In fact, the US gasoline tax debate is an extreme case. Most developed countries, unlike
the United States, have imposed high taxes on gasoline. Further, the United States has
adopted a number of costly measures aimed at achieving reductions in gasoline consumption
(such as corporate automobile fuel economy standards) and the pollution associated with
automobile use (as in the 1991 Clean Air Act). Many of the goals of these measures
could have been achieved at lower social cost through a tax on gasoline (Crandall 1992).
Finally, it may be observed that the resistance to gasoline taxation was equally vigorous
when the good sought was not an improvement in the environment but a reduction in
vulnerability to disturbances in oil supplies from the Middle East. In this case, again, the
United States preferred to seek the goal through an alternative, apparently more expensive,
route - the creation, deployment and use of a military capability to ensure the free flow of
oil.
All of this leads to the conclusion that there is strong resistance to the taxation of
gasoline in the United States. This is a problem for policymakers seeking to develop
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proposals for global reductions in CO2 emissions. However, it cannot be regarded as a
representative illustration of the willingness of citizens in developed countries to trade
off economic welfare for environmental protection.
Variability and uncertainty
It was shown above that uncertainty about the extent, pattern and timing of global
warming has no effect on cost estimates derived using the optimal climate approach. This
is not true for dynamic estimates. It is useful to distinguish between damage associated
with predictable variations in the degree and rate of warming and damage associated with
pure uncertainty.
The costs of predictable variability arise from the fact, demonstrated in Proposition
2, that damages are a convex function of the rate of warming. This means that the
expected damage level is greater than the damage associated with the expected rate of
warming.
Similarly, the convexity of the damage function implies that damages will be greater
the more uneven is the rate of warming. Hence, cost estimates derived from the impact of
the mean rate of warming will be biased downwards to the extent that rates of warming
are higher in some areas than in others (assuming, as above, that this variation is uncorrelated
with the existing temperature).
The same analysis applies to the distribution of warming over time. Most available
projections imply a gradual and uniform increase in temperature. This is an artifact of the
modelling techniques that are used. In fact, the rate of warming is likely to be highly
non-uniform. One reason is simply statistical. The warming trend due to the build-up of
greenhouse gases is super-imposed on ill-understood cyclical climatic fluctuations of
varying periodicities (up to decades). During the period 1940 to 1980, a cyclical downturn
was sufficient to offset the underlying trend presumed to be associated with the buildup
of CO2. Conversely, in periods when an upward cyclical fluctuation is superimposed on
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the upward secular trend the rate of warming will be  above the long run mean.
In addition to this statistical point it is likely that the climate system involves a
wide range of non-linearities and threshold effects that are not captured by the climate
models now available. These will also imply fluctuations in the rate of increase of
temperature, particularly at the local level.
All of these effects arise on the assumption that the time-path of warming, though
variable, is known with certainty. Uncertainty implies losses over and above those associated
with the convexity of the damage function. The optimal outcome V* in (6) above was
derived on the assumption that the time-path of climatic change was known in advance at
every point. The fact that the effects of global change are highly uncertain, especially at a
local level, implies losses that are independent of risk-aversion or convexity of the
damage function. In the presence of uncertainty, individuals will take actions in response
to climatic change that turn out, ex postto have been sub-optimal. These sub-optimal
decisions may represent either a failure to take sufficient measures to deal with climatic
change or excessive investment which turns out to have been unnecessary.
For example, farmers faced with a run of dry seasons must choose whether to
continue to make investments in agriculture or to sell and move elsewhere. If ex post, the
run of dry seasons turns out to have been a random fluctuation, those who sold will have
made a costly error. Conversely if the climate has undergone a permanent change, those
who persevered will regret their decision.
Another way of looking at this is that the information held by economic actors
about the climate becomes more diffuse, and hence less valuable in the presence of a new
source of uncertainty. Thus climate change may be regarded as destroying information.
This information may in some cases be represented by formal probability distributions
over temperature and rainfall derived from historical records. More frequently, it is the
informal knowledge of particular local climates that is acquired by attentive individuals
over a long period. Once again this is a dynamic problem.
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These considerations relate to moderate variations in the rate of global warming. It
is necessary, in addition to consider the possibility of an ‘apocalyptic’ outcome arising
from unforeseen interaction effects. Such outcomes might include the melting of the
Antarctic ice sheets or the diversion of the Gulf stream away from Northern Europe.
Although the probability of such outcomes is low, the costs would be very large.
Concluding comments
Most assessments of the likely consequences of climate change have adopted a
comparative static approach, in which the initial situation is compared to that which is
expected to prevail after some given increase in temperature. Some assessments have been
based on existing patterns of economic activity, thereby precluding adjustment. Going to
the opposite extreme, Ricardian approaches incorporating the notion of a climatic
optimum have, in effect, assumed that adjustment is costless.
In this paper, it has argued that the main costs of climate change will be costs of
adjustment. Stocks of both natural capital and long-lived physical capital will be reduced
in value as a result of climate change. This loss will be enhanced if the process of climate
change is variable and stochastic.
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